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1. Introduction
Argument theory has witnessed three decades of remarkable flowering, a proliferation of
theoretical insights, and following the Iron Law of Theory Formation, each has been
developed in contradistinction to the others. It’s not that theorists have been insular. On
the contrary, they have for the most part proceeded with a thorough and accurate
knowledge of activities in other theoretical gardens besides their own, even borrowing
cuttings from one another (for example Walton from Pragma-Dialectics, 1998) or digging
together (for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst with Jackson and Jacobs, 1993).
They’ve exhibited together, every four years, at the Amsterdam theory show. This
familiarity, however, has not produced much theoretical integration.
Theoretical integration is not theoretical assimilation. Incompatible theories cannot be
assimilated. But what if two apparently conflicting theories turn out to be about different
subject matters, and so not incompatible after all? Or what if the claim that a paradigm is
mistaken turns out to be better framed as a claim that it has been mis-applied by
overenthusiastic (or imperialistic) advocates? What if the reach of a particular theory
exceeds its grasp, but within its proper sphere it cannot be seriously faulted? What if an
appearance of conflict turns out to be due to a misunderstanding? In such cases,
theoretical integration would show how the different theories could cohabit. The result of
looking to see how everything fits together might require greater modesty on the part of
individual theoretical players, but a more accurate estimate of the extent of their
respective theoretical domains.
To be sure, seeing how “everything” fits together is too ambitious a goal for a single
short paper. In order to find where opportunities for integration might fruitful, it is useful
to look where conflict and incompatibility have been thought to exist. Some of those
historical antagonisms include: different conceptions of argument, and of argumentation;
formal logic vs. argumentation and informal logic; logic vs. rhetoric vs. dialectic;
Pragma-Dialectics vs. informal logic; emotion, intuition and logic. There are certainly
others. In this paper I will examine just these antagonisms or ambitions, seeking common
ground, or possibilities for coexistence.

2. Conceptions of argument
Twenty-five years ago D.J. O’Keefe (1977, 1982) drew to our attention the significance
of two very different concepts denoted by the word ‘argument.’ As it happens, each of
the two has several variants, and the Oxford English Dictionary lists another four or five
senses of the word. I recently tracked the definitions of O’Keefe’s “argument1” in about
30 of the formal logic textbooks published since 1950 (reported in Blair, 2003) and found
several distinct varieties, including the following three: (a) sets of propositions such that
one is implied (or supported) by the others, (b) propositions taken to imply (or support)
another, and (c) propositions offered in support of a claim. The first makes no reference
to human judgement or intention but the other two do. The second makes such an
argument out to require human intention, but not communication. The third requires both
intention and communication. Which of the three is the correct conception of argument1?
The answer I suggest is: any of them. It depends on one’s interests. If you are
interested in the syntactic or semantic implication relationships among propositions, then
what’s of interest to you are simply groups of propositions. Those relationships obtain
whether or not anyone thinks of them or knows about them. There is a tradition in which
such implication-related proposition sets are called arguments, but in that case, you are
talking about something different from arguments understood as what people take to be
reasons why something is true or something should be done, which is also a sense of
‘argument’ with a tradition of use behind it. Both these senses are different from the
third, because one person can offer another person reasons for believing something or
doing something that don’t imply or otherwise support it and that the arguer doesn’t think
support it either. Yet this too is something widely called an argument. To my knowledge,
there is no good reason for assigning a privileged status to one of these senses over the
other two. The argument theorist might want to pick one for some theoretical purpose or
another. One could in principle determine empirically their respective frequencies of use,
but to what purpose?
3. Argumentation
The word ‘argumentation’ has many meanings in English too, but the one that has
acquired currency in argumentation theory is “a discussion dealing with a controversial
point” (Random House Dictionary, 1967), especially if it involves the use of arguments.
The theorists here stipulate different definitions. As stipulations one can perhaps have no
quarrel with them, however, they have a way of eliding into what Stevenson dubbed
“persuasive definitions”(1944). For example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst are quite
careful to insist that the definition of argumentation that they give in their
groundbreaking 1984 book is a stipulation (see 1984, 18, and endnote 10), but by the time
of their introduction (with Snoeck Henkemans) to their 1996 review of the literature
anthology, they say, without qualification that “the general characteristics of
argumentation are . . . recapitulated in the following definition:”
Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or
decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader,

by putting together a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the
standpoint before a rational judge. (1996, 5)
Here is the epistemologist Alvin Goldman’s take on “argumentation” (1999, p. 131):
If a speaker presents an argument to an audience, in which he asserts and defends
the conclusion by appeal to the premises, I call this activity argumentation. More
specifically, this counts as monological argumentation, a stretch of argumentation
with a single speaker. Later I shall also discuss dialogical argumentation, in which
two or more speakers discourse with one another, taking opposite sides of the issue
over the truth of the conclusion.
And here is the informal logician Ralph Johnson’s account (2000, p. 12):
By “the practice of argumentation,” I understand the sociocultural activity of
constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments. (p. 12)
Goldman criticizes Pragma-Dialectics as focussed on producing rational agreement, but
inadequate to optimize truth (Goldman, 1999, 160). As avowed Popperians, van Eemeren
and Grootendorst would, I expect, take issue with Goldman’s veritistic epistemology.
Johnson questions whether the Pragma-Dialectical rules guarantee the kind of manifest
rationality that he espouses, which can require giving arguments even if one’s
interlocutor doesn’t require them (Johnson, 2000, pp. 309-320).
But why should Goldman or Johnson criticize the Pragma-Dialectical conception of
argumentation? Goldman’s interest lies in a procedure that transmits knowledge and
maximizes true belief. Johnson’s interest lies in a procedure that ensures evidently or
manifestly rational persuasion. And van Eemeren and Grootendorst are interested in a
procedure that resolves disagreements in a way that satisfies constraints of procedural
rationality. Each defines argumentation to suit his theoretical goals, and there is nothing
wrong with that. The mistake occurs when any one of them criticizes the others’
definitions for failing to be based on his theoretical preoccupations—in other words,
when any one of them proclaims his definition as the correct or the one and only adequate
definition of argumentation. None of these theorists makes the case that his is the only
correct conception of argumentation.
4. Formal logic and argument
At the beginning of their current era of flourishing, both the speech communication and
the informal logic orientations to argument and argumentation attacked logic, or formal
logic. Scriven asserted that the emergence of informal logic, “marks the end of the reign
of formal logic. Not by any means the end of the subject, just its relegation to its proper
place in the academic zoo, somewhere over just north of mathematics and west of
computer science . . . ” (1980, p. 147). Willard likened the relation between propositional
or syllogistic logic to actual arguments to the relation between a nineteen-legged French
Provincial table to an ordinary four-legged table (1983, pp. 29-30). These are amusing

comments, and typical of the revolt against formal logic that occurred in the 1960s and
1970s. The vigor of the vituperation suggests that those making the criticisms might have
been exorcising their own demons.
I don’t mean to suggest that the critique of the hegemony of deductive logic was
mistaken, but the problem is not with logic. It lies in taking logic to be the normative
theory of argument. Most logicians, when practising their craft, focus on the purely
formal properties of logical systems, leaving the applications of those systems to others.
Some argumentation theorists retain a central role for deductive implication relationships.
The Pragma-Dialecticians (1984, 1992) have opted for deductive reconstruction in the
analysis of arguments, and Groarke (1995, 1999) has been arguing for something
similar—what I call “methodological deductivism.” They treat arguments as if they are
supposed to be deductively valid and reconstruct them on that assumption, thus finessing
the problem of having to deal with premise-conclusion relationships for which no
theoretical account yet exists. Whether or not that approach leads to overlooking whole
classes of arguments, as Govier (1987, 1999) and Walton (1996) have contended, is a
debate that can be carried on within the argumentation community without disparaging
formal logic. Also, other norms besides deductive validity, or even deductive validity and
inductive strength, no longer have to struggle for recognition. Logicians have recognized
that dialectic and rhetoric introduce essential perspectives. The idea that arguments can
be adequately analyzed and evaluated outside the contexts or situations of their use is
more or less dead among all but the most isolated philosophers and logicians. And
deductive logic, in the service of computer modelling and artificial intelligence, has itself
changed so much over this period that non-monotonic logics that can model the
flexibility and ceteris paribus character of the situated inferences of actual reasoning and
arguments are at the cutting edge of logical theory.
The upshot is that argument theory is now robust enough to tolerate old-fashioned
deductive logic, and contemporary deductive logic has adapted itself to the imperatives of
argument theory. The antagonism of argumentation theorists towards formal logic should
be a thing of the past.
5. Logic, rhetoric and dialectics
A certain amount of pushing and shoving goes on among the adherents of a logic-first
approach, a dialectic-first approach and a rhetoric-first approach to argument analysis and
evaluation. The Pragma-Dialectical school takes dialectics to be primary, rhetoric as
strategic manoeuvring in dialectical interactions, and logic as a contribution to rational
dialectic. Tindale suggests that rhetoric is foundational (1999, p. 18)—that argument is at
root rhetorical, and dialectic and logic supervene upon it. Johnson (2000) takes logic to
be fundamental, dialectic to complete it, and rhetoric to serve it. They cannot all be right,
but they can all be wrong. I think Wenzel (1990) was right: each of logic, dialectic and
rhetoric is an essential perspective on, or aspect of argument, with none more important
than the others.
Here’s why. Apart from quarrels, there can be no argument without a reference to
reasons (cf. Jacobs, 2000, p. 264). Even the Monty Python disputes—“It is. / No it isn’t. /
Yes it is.” and “I did. / No you didn’t. / Yes I did.”—give way to, “Prove it. / No, you

prove it.” Whenever the reasons are identified, one can ask: What kind and strength of
support do they offer? The answer comes from some theory of logic, if logic is
understood to include the theory of cogent support. So, no argument without logic. Yet
most argument occurs in the context of exchanges between contending parties, or
occupants of contending roles, and one can ask whether such exchanges are well ordered.
The answer comes from some theory of dialectic. So, almost no argument without
dialectic. Finally, at least for argument considered as a tool of attitude-change, the
exercise of the art of presentation is inescapable from the advocate’s perspective, as it is
no less from the perspective of the interpreter of the advocacy, or of its critic. Moreover,
considering argument as particular type (or collection of types) of communication, all the
resources of the art and craft of communication have application to it. Rhetoric, either in
its narrower or its wider characterizations, is the name of these arts. So, no argument
without rhetoric.
If it be argued that since one must take the rhetorical perspective in order accurately to
interpret the logic of someone’s argument, rhetoric is basic to logic (see Tindale, 1999), I
would reply that what originally motivates the hunt is the logic, sine qua, non; so, by
parity of reasoning, logic is basic. Similar arguments refute the claims to primacy of
dialectic and of logic. Grant that all arguments, including monological ones, can be
modelled as dialogical exchanges; even so, what makes those dialogues argumentative
exchanges, as distinct from, say, chat exchanges—“Nice day.”/ “Sure is.”—is that the
turn-takers offer up reasons for their claims, reasons purported and expected to pass some
test of minimal logical adequacy. And to turn the point around, the appeal to logic in
argumentation is made in the service, typically, of responses to dialectical challenges,
carried out in a way that achieve the arguer’s wider communicative goals and (perhaps)
narrower persuasive objectives.
6. Pragma-Dialectics and informal logic
Johnson (2000) thinks informal logic competes with Pragma-Dialectics, which he
discusses in a section titled, “Alternative Theories” (see pp. 309-320). But over the years,
theorists who self-identify as informal logicians (such as Walton, and Johnson himself)
have tended to agree with the Pragma-Dialecticians that informal logic’s focus is as much
pragmatic as logical (indeed, Johnson subtitles his book, “A pragmatic theory of
argument”), and that argument is typically and deeply dialectical (see Blair and Johnson’s
early article, 1987). While informal logicians have approached the identification and
interpretation of arguments without a theoretical underpinning like speech-act theory,
they haven’t held that the Pragma-Dialectical use of speech-act theory is mistaken. I’ve
noted that some informal logicians argue against the need for deductive-reconstruction in
interpreting. For instance, Walton (1996), Govier (1999), Pinto (2001), and Blair (1999,
2001), have variously proposed that there are legitimate patterns of argument that such a
reconstruction would distort. This disagreement, however, is not a deep opposition
between contending theories. Nothing prevents someone committed to a pragmadialectical approach in general, and to all other details of the official Pragma-Dialectical
theory, from suggesting a revision in line with the views of these informal logicians. It is
true that one or two of the famous ten Pragma-Dialectical commandments (van Eemeren

& Grootendorst, 1992) would have to be modified, as would some details of the theory’s
prescriptions for explicitizing unexpressed premises, since those prescriptions rely on the
theory’s methodological deductivism (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, Ch. 6),
but those changes would not be incompatible with the spirit of the pragma-dialectical
project.
Another apparent source of disagreement between some informal logicians and
Pragma-Dialectics is the latter’s working assumption that all arguments can most
fruitfully be analyzed as approximations of the Pragma-Dialectical ideal model. Blair
(1998) and Govier (1999) take issue with this view. However, there is nothing
particularly associated with informal logic behind dissent from the universal applicability
of the Pragma-Dialectical model. Presumably for proponents of Pragma-Dialectics
themselves there is no a priori commitment to its universal applicability, for otherwise the
theory would have become an ideology rather what it is expressly presented as, namely a
valid normative/descriptive theory. So the extent of its applicability must be an open
question even from within the theory.
7. Emotion, intuition and logic
In Coalescent Argumentation (1997), Gilbert takes aim at logic, formal and informal, as
hostile to emotion and intuition as modes of argument. Part of his target is the practice of
decontextualizing argument, leaving out of account both the fact that so-called “claims”
are almost always but fragments of or abstractions from an interconnected complex of
views better understood as a position (see pp. 105-106), and positions attached to
individual persons—a point made by Willard a decade earlier, 1989, pp. 63-64.) For
example, being opposed to abortion on demand usually doesn’t stand independently of a
world-view. Part of Gilbert’s target is the view that reason is incompatible with emotions
and feelings. Surely Juan’s deep and exclusive love for Amelia is a good reason why she
should marry him (see “emotional” mode, pp. 82ff.) and getting a creepy feeling from
being in it is surely a good reason for not buying a house (see “kisceral” mode, pp. 86ff.).
Gilbert contends that any logic rejects such arguments.
The advice that particular arguments be situated in the contexts of their interlocutors’
attitudes is well taken. But informal logic from its inception pressed for looking at reallife arguments in their contexts (see Johnson & Blair, 1980). As for emotions and
feelings, the fact that such reasons don’t strictly entail the judgements grounded on them
is, for informal logic, certainly no bar against such reasoning, or arguments invoking it.
Moreover, current theories of practical reasoning do not reject emotions and feelings as
irrational or as otherwise illegitimate as reasons for actions (e.g., Audi, 1989). In
philosophical discussions of emotions for many years now the Hume/Kant dichotomy
between reason and emotion or feeling has been rejected (see Solomon 1977, de Sousa
1987). So here is another “disagreement” that dissolves upon examination.
8. Conclusion
There is much more to be said, but if the thesis of this paper is correct, then there is less

disagreement and theoretical conflict on the current argumentation scene than some have
thought. In some cases, apparently conflicting conceptions are just different; in some
cases what have been taken to be conflicts between theories are disagreements, sure
enough, but not clashes of deep theoretical perspective; in some cases perceived
incompatibilities are compatible. I have tried no more than to illustrate a few ways in
which argument theory integration might be carried out in order to encourage others to
take up the challenge and do the job properly.
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